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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss how systems with Artificial Intelligence (AI) can undergo safety 
assessment. This is relevant, if AI is used in safety related applications. Taking a deeper look 
into AI models, we show, that many models of artificial intelligence, in particular machine 
learning, are statistical models. Safety assessment would then have to concentrate on the 
model that is used in AI, besides the normal assessment procedure. Part of the budget of 
dangerous random failures for the relevant safety integrity level needs to be used for the 
probabilistic faulty behavior of the AI system. We demonstrate our thoughts with a simple 
example and propose a research challenge that may be decisive for the use of AI in safety-
related systems. 
Introduction 
In the last years, artificial intelligence (AI) has become more and more popular and an 
increasing number of applications has been reported. These include for example 
• Data processing 
• Assistance systems  
• Speech recognition 
• Face recognition 
• Nursing robots 
• Autonomous driving systems 
• Art etc. 
Some of the applications of artificial intelligence may be safety relevant. Then, functional safety 
standards should be applied and as a consequence, safety assessment is required. 
In this paper, we consider safety assessment of systems with AI. In the second section we 
describe, what AI means. In the third section we show, how a safety integrity level for AI 
systems can be obtained. In section four we will take a deeper view into AI systems – this is 
necessary to understand AI systems and to have an approach to them in terms of functional 
safety. In the fifth section, we describe the requirements of the functional safety standards for 
AI systems and a possible assessment procedure. In section six, we provide an example, of 
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how safety assessment could be carried out on a very simple system. In the last section, we 
present our conclusions. 
 
What is artificial intelligence? 
There exist many publications and many systems are named as being artificially intelligent. An 
overview can be found e.g. in Brunette et al (2009). The starting point has been the Turing test 
in the 50s, which is intended to check whether a computer exhibits intelligent behavior, 
comparable to that of a human being. Later on, the concept of evolutionary programs has been 
established. The term „Artificial Intelligence“ has first been used at Dartmouth College in 1956. 
In the meanwhile, different concepts have been proposed by many researchers.  
Artificial Intelligence can be defined as intelligence demonstrated by machines. Artificial 
intelligence mimics cognitive functions, learning, problem solving etc.  
A question is, whether the following are criteria of intelligence points would be criteria for 
artificial intelligence or not:  
• use of speech, 
• consciousness, 
• self-awareness. 
But while there are truly astounding results, there are many articles and presentations about 
the „deep learning hype“, see e.g. Hättasch&Geisler (2019), and as far as we know there is so 
far no published complete safety argument for any AI application, but there are many research 
projects on safety justifications for AI. 
However some approaches have been recently made from a safety point of view, most notably 
the draft UL 4600 standard (2019), which demands a safety case approach for autonomous 
vehicles, that may utilize AI algorithms. However also UL 4600 elaborates only on What to 
argue, but not the How. This is clearly described in the preface: “Conformance with this 
standard is not a guarantee of a safe automated vehicle.” Its emphasis is rather on “repeatable 
assessment of the thoroughness of a safety case”. UL 4600 is intended be used as an 
extension of IEC 61508. 
Other standardization committees, e. g. the German DKE, focus on a process and lifecycle 
oriented approach. Putzer (2019) propagates a λAI, a measure similar to a hazard rate in 
functional safety, but gives no concise definition. 
Does AI need a SIL? 
In this section we will discuss, whether we would need a safety integrity level for artificial 
intelligence and if yes, how it should be determined. 
The concept of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is used in many standards for functional safety. The 
mother standard is the well-known IEC 61508. The reader may be referred to Schäbe (2018) 
for the determination of SILs. 
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The following figure 1 shows the situation with a normal electric, electronic, programmable 
electronic system (E/E/PE system). Here, we have an equipment under control, information 
form sensors that enter the control system and actors operated by the control system. 
Depending on the consequences of faulty behavior of the control system, the latter gets a 
safety integrity level (SIL). 
 
 
Figure 1 E/E/PE Control system 
 
Now, it does not matter what type of control system we have. For the hazard analysis and the 
determination of the SIL it is considered as a black box anyway. This is depicted in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Arbitrary control system (black box) 
Now, the black box can also be an AI system. Therefore, also a safety integrity level can be 
necessary if the AI system fulfills safety relevant tasks and the SIL can be determined by the 
same methods as for an E/E/PE system. Only the rules for the assessment of the SIL may be 
different depending on the type of system that implements the black box. 
What SIL would we have to expect for different AI applications? This would mainly depend on 
the failure consequence and if other risk mitigations are possible: 
• Data processing – depends on the results and what is done with it 
• Assistance systems – normally no SIL if a human can always override the system 
• Speech recognition – depends on what is done with the result and whether there are 
safe backups 
• Face recognition – depends on what is done with the result, i.e. which functions are 
activated 
• Nursing robots – giving medicine, carrying patients, so surely a SIL would be required 
• Autonomous driving systems – can lead to accidents, so a SIL would be required 
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In any case, a hazard and risk analysis needs to be carried out to determine the SIL – or the 
fact that it is not necessary to determine one. The relevant functional safety standard has to 
be applied. 
 
Looking inside AI 
AI architecture 
Figure 3 shows a very simple architecture of an AI system. The architecture has been inspired 
by Wand (2017) but does not resemble it.  
 
Figure 3 – Architecture of an AI system 
Inside the AI system is the model, the most important feature. This model is flexible and needs 
to undergo a teach-in. This is done on the basis of some data. These data must be 
representative, i.e. they must be adequate to resemble future situations. It is necessary to 
avoid situations as mentioned e.g. reported by Corni (2019), where an AI system shows 
racism, which was imported via a non-representative set of data for learning. 
After teach-in, parameters are set in the model. This is later used to generate reactions to 
request data and activate actors in order to control the equipment under control. Possibly, 
teach-in can continue even after the system has been put into exploitation. 
Then it is important to 
• Check the model, 
• Check the representativeness of the data, 
• Verify the data – model reaction – action chain, and to 
• Carry out an overall validation. 
In the following subsections, we will take a deeper look into several types of AI systems. This 
will refine the model part of the architecture described in figure 3. 
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Looking at AI by Similarity Analysis 
As explained by figure 3 most AI algorithms rely on or are at least similar to statistics. So as a 
first approach to explore the requirements for use of AI in safety applications we could what a 
statistical procedure would have to fulfill if we wanted to use it for safety applications This can 
also be interpreted as a kind of similarity analysis. What can we learn from statistical 
procedures? What would be the consequences if AI algorithms e. g. machine learning could 
just be interpreted as statistical data fitting – but with very complex algorithms and big data? 
To explain the situation intuitively, let’s use one of the simplest statistical models, which every 
engineer knows from school: linear regression i. e. fitting of a (straight) line to data. What can 
we learn in general from it? Note that this observation is not new, Pearl and Mackenzie already 
stated that neural networks “…are driven by a stream of observations to which they attempt to 
fit a function, in much the same way that a statistician tries to fit a line to a collection of points.” 
But to the knowledge of the authors this similarity has not been fully exploited yet. 
Let us assume that some safety-critical decision would depend on the goodness of the fitted 
curve. A very good example what can go wrong has been constructed by Anscombe (1973). 
In his data sets, see figure 4, all relevant statistical measures are equal to at least two decimal 
places, although obviously the sets appear very different. 
Figure 4 gives some examples of a correct fit (data set 1); a data set (2), where obviously the 
wrong model was used; a data set (3), which is influenced by an outlier; and data set (4) with 
a leverage point, which results from a completely inadequate experimental design. Even from 
this simple example we can draw some important conclusions: 
1: The model must be correct – otherwise we will never fit the data well (see data set 2), no 
matter how long we learn or how good the data might be. 
2. The training data must be representative of the real data; particular we must make sure that 
the sampling is adequate (see data set 4) 
3. We must have means to detect outliers (and even to remove them, see data set 3) or even 
Black Swans  
4. We need a measure of goodness of fit (like R2 in normal regression). But such a measure 
and the calculated fit depends on the loss function (see data set 1, where the usual least 
squares loss function is assumed like in all other fits in figure 4) 
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Figure 4 – Examples of what can be learned from linear regression  
© User: Schutz / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0 
 
Machine Learning as a classification problem 
Machine learning (ML) is a particularly successful variant of AI. Statistically it can also be 
interpreted as a classification problem, which provides another look on the problem.  So, all 
our findings in the preceding section directly hold for ML. Basically, most ML algorithms solve 
classification problems, similar to cluster or discrimination analysis in statistics. We have (at 
least) two classes of (big) data in a high dimensional space., see figure 5 for an illustrative two-
dimensional example. 
An optimal discrimination function would separate the classes completely for the training set. 
We may assume that a true („correct“) discrimination function exists (the red curve in figure 5), 
but in practice ML algorithms calculate an approximation of the true function. However, there 
remains some space between the two classes and there exists no unique solution for the 
problem. 
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Figure 5 – Discrimination of two data sets in classification 
© User: Alisneaky/ Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0 
 
Artificial Neuronal Networks and the General approximation Theorem 
The most polular and recently most successful variant of ML algorithms are Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN). Each ANN has at least two layers that are connected by weights. A simple 
example is shown in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 – artificial neural network with two layers  
© User: Glosser.ca / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0 
 
A mathematical model of this simple ANN can be described ed as follows: the input data vector 
x is transformed by weights v and w, offsets b and an output function  (non-constant, bounded 
and continuous) to two output classes 
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𝐹ሺ𝑥ሻ = σ 𝜈𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝜑ሺ𝑤𝑖
𝑇𝑥 + 𝑏𝑖ሻ (1) 
 
The optimal weights for a particular cost function C, which is defined in addition to (1), are 
found iteratively based on the training data and a numerical algorithm. 
More complex ANN add additional hidden layers (often called deep networks), but the 
mathematical description and solution is similar. 
From our general discussion above immediately the following questions arise: 
 Is F the correct function to discriminate the data well?  
 Does it approximate the true function well?  
 Or do we need more layers or more complex functions? 
 How can we make sure that the training data are representative? 
 How can we detect outliers? 
 How can we justify the cost function C? 
If we cannot answer the questions sufficiently, we might have systematic flaws in the model! 
Fortunately, for question 1 there exist a variety of so called “universal approximation 
theorems”, that show convergence of F to f, the true function, provided 𝜑 is a bounded and 
continuous function and if f is continuous, see Cybenko (1989). Note that this is convergence 
as in the calculus definition, not some stochastic convergence. 
This is quite a strong result, but it has implications related to the other questions. The most 
limiting assumption is the continuity of the true function f, which means that our problem space 
must be separable by a continuous function. And also 𝜑 must be continuous, so we can’t use 
jump functions for the decision making. 
At first glance this result is surprising because it already holds for ANN with a single hidden 
layer but on second thought the results are quite obvious and a have a simple explanation: 
1) F is a kind of general linear approximation to f. But it is obvious that such linear 
approximation for a continuous function f should be possible if the number of nodes N is 
sufficiently large. Also, in the classification example in figure 5 f could be approximated by 
stepwise linear functions. 
2) Also, deep ANN with several hidden layers could be represented by single layer (with large 
N). Just think that the true function f would be the function represented by the multi layer 
network, which by the approximation theorem again could be approximated by a single layer 
function F. 
For dependable applications, the requirements to answer question 1 could be: 
1) Choose a single-layer ANN with sufficiently large N. N could be determined by a 
convergence criterion as known from calculus. 
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2) The more difficult assumption that needs to be justified would be that the data sets can be 
separated by a continuous function. This argument would depend on the type of application 
data and can hardly be general. 
3) Choose an appropriate cost function C (with justification). 
 
Data and Goodness of fit 
The second question deals with the adequacy of the training data and also with the associated 
stopping rule: when is training finished?  
Representative data means that teach-in must occur in a typical environment for this type of 
system and the environment must be such that the influences are typical for this type of use, 
including all the changes in the environment. So, all replications of the system (after teach-in) 
must be operated at least in similar environments and all replications of the system must be 
similar, compare Braband et al (2018). Here we must in particular also take care of the Black 
Swan problem (related to question 3). Possibly we have to introduce safety-related application 
rules for the environment in which the system will operate. 
Another question is goodness of fit. How do we measure goodness-of-fit for the training data? 
Can we accept failure in training data? Generally, any misclassification in training data could 
lead to a high proportion of classification failure in practice. Take as an example the black point 
on the boundary line in figure 5. Assume now that both data sets are separated by the true 
(red) function f in figure 5. If this particular point is mis-classified, a whole set of points close to 
the black point would be misclassified, too, resulting in a high failure rate. On the other hand 
this point might also be an outlier. 
This means 
1. Either we have 100% correct classification in the training data, or 
2. We can calculate the error probability well 
The problem is that we cannot simply count classification errors. We have to weight them 
according to their importance, which may be difficult in high-dimensional spaces and big data. 
Furthermore, teach-in has clearly statistical aspects. This means: 
• Confidence bounds need to be taken into account. 
• Derived parameters are random values containing some spread 
• The subsequent decisions of the AI will also be random, with some errors: 
o First kind error: wrong decision, although the input data are in the „right“ domain 
o Second kind error: input data are in the „wrong domain“, but decision is „right“. 
As a consequence, the AI will have a failure probability. This must be taken into account, 
assigning part of the budget of the rate of dangerous failures to the AI (here: the algorithm). 
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The position of functional safety standards on AI and a possible assessment 
procedure 
If AI is used for safety relevant applications, the standards on functional safety would come 
into play. We consult the basic standard, IEVC 61508.Requirements of the functional safety 
standards – example: IEC 61508. The main information is contained in IEC 61508-3, table A.2: 
no. 5 - Artificial intelligence / fault correction SIL 2- SIL 4: NR (see C.3.12) 
no. 6 - Dynamic reconfiguration SIL2 – SIL 4: NR (see C3.13) 
In part IEC 61508-7 an explanation can be found, what ai means in the terms of the standard 
C.3.9 Artificial intelligence 
Fault forecasting (calculating trends), fault correction, maintenance and supervisory 
actions may be supported by artificial intelligence (AI) based systems in a very efficient 
way in diverse channels of a system, since the rules might be derived directly from the 
specifications and checked against these. Certain common faults which are introduced 
into specifications, by implicitly already having some design and implementation rules 
in mind, may be avoided effectively by this approach, especially when applying a 
combination of models and methods in a functional or descriptive manner. The methods 
are selected in such a way that faults may be corrected, and the effects of failures be 
minimised, in order to meet the desired safety integrity. 
In fact, the IEC 61508 sees AI as a means for fault correction and dynamic reconfiguration as 
a reaction of a fault in the control system. Such an application would make the control system 
unpredictable. 
How to cope with the IEC 61508 rules against artificial intelligence? The statement in the 
standard is combined with a statement about dynamic reconfiguration, which is an undesired 
for SIL 2 …SIL 4. If AI is implemented in the control system itself, this would not be a reaction 
on faults of the control system, it would be a feature. 
The functional safety standard requires a predictable system. Predictable means that 
measures against systematic failures so that they can be neglected. Random failures‘ 
occurrence is brought to a sufficiently low level. 
Therefore, AI system‘s behavior must be predictable in a statistical sense. Note that this 
predictive behavior here is not a deterministic behavior, but a statistically predictable behavior. 
This means that the AI system will contribute to random dangerous failures that would be 
caused by a random behavior of the software itself. This is a key difference to normal E/E/PE 
systems, where software is considered deterministic with systematic errors only requirements 
and following the software requirements of the functional safety standards would reduce them 
to an acceptable level. 
An assessment approach can then be based on the following steps: 
• Analyzing the model, 
• Taking part of the budget for random failures for the AI system since it shows 
probabilistic behavior, 
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• Treat the AI system as a normal mathematical model, but only with probabilistic 
behavior. 
Then assessment is carried out in the same manner as a normal safety assessment with a 
complicated mathematical model. It is not the intention of the author to repeat the procedures 
of safety assessment. For details of an assessment process see e.g. Wigger (2018). 
The main part of the assessment is the model check.  
The mathematical model needs to be checked regarding the following aspects: 
• correctness of the model according to physical / chemical / mathematical and other 
scientific proven theories, 
• equivalence to other mathematical models as e.g. of brake curves, thermal models etc. 
That means, the theory / model must be disclosed to the assessor. The models might be of 
one of the following types, see e.g. Wang (2018): 
• Neural network, 
• Long short-term memory, 
• Auto encoder, 
• Deep Boltzman machine, 
• Generative adversarial network, 
• Attention-based LSTM. 
The more flexible the model, the more complicated its analysis will be. In the next section we 
provide an example on how such a model analysis could be carried out for a very simple model. 
The great effort for model checking leads to the question, whether proven in use approaches 
could be applied. According to Braband et al (2018) this would mean to accumulated a 
minimum number of failure free hours according to the following scheme: 
• 3 106 failure free hours for SIL 1 
• 3 108 failure free hours for SIL 4 
Practical experience shows that it is hard to accumulate such a quantity of failure free hours. 
As a result, model analysis as one of the main parts of safety assessment needs to be done. 
 
Academic Example 
Assume a classification system that classifies objects in two categories: „left“ and „right“ based 
on one real-valued parameter. The parameter is assumed to be normally distributed.  Note 
that statistically the model is completely defined by this assumption, which would have to be 
justified in practical applications. It can’t be taken for granted, and for this reason we label it as 
an academic example as we assume to know the true model. 
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There are two sub-populations characterized by the following distributions: 
• „left“ is characterized by a normal distribution with mean m
L
 and spread 
L
, 
• „right“ is characterized by a normal distribution with mean m
R
 and spread 
R
. 
First, assume the parameters to be known. 
Then the following classification rule is established: 
„left“ if X≤z and „right“ if X>z, 
where is a „properly“ chosen constant. Now the first kind error and the second kind error can 
be computed 
 = 1 - Φ(z-m
L
/
L
)  first kind error, (2) 
=   Φ(z-m
R
/
R
)  second kind error, (3) 
Φ(z-mL/
L
)  correct „left“ classification, (4) 
1- Φ(z-m
R
/
R
)  correct „right“ classification, (5) 
Φ – standard normal integral. 
The first kind error is the probability that an object is classified in the sub-population “right” 
although it belongs to “left”. The second kind error is the probability that that an object is 
classified in the sub-population “left” although it belongs to “right”. The parameters 
R
 and 
L
 
should be as small as possible to have small errors. 
Now there is one missing point. Parameters m
L
, m
R
, 
L
 and 
R
 are not known but must be 
obtained by a statistical procedure that means that they must be learned from a sample of 
data. 
How does the system learn? The system learns from two samples for the both sub-populations: 
A „left“ sample XL
i
, i=1,n
L
 and a „right“ sample XR
i
, i=1,…,n
R
 are used for teaching. 
From the samples, the unknown parameters can be estimated: 
m
R
 = (1/n
L
)  XR
i
, (6) 
m
L
 = (1/n
L
)  XL
i
, (7) 

R
2
 =  (XR
i
 – m
R
)
2
/(n
R
-1), (8) 

L
2
 =  (XL
i
 – m
L
)
2
/(n
R
-1). (9) 
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The point estimators of statistical characteristics are given in italics. The sum runs over the 
index i for 1 to n
L
 or n
R
, respectively. 
In a next step the confidence limits for the parameters have to be used instead of the point 
estimators given by (6) – (9). Confidence limits will be chosen as such that the misclassification 
error becomes large, i.e. upper bounds for the sigmas and m
L
 and a lower bound for m
R
. We 
use single parameter bounds – not combined ones - to simplify the computation. 
The point estimators (6) – (9) have the following distributions: 
(n
L
-1) 
L
2
 / 
L
2
  is chi-squared distributed with n
L
-1 degrees of freedom 
(n
R
-1) 
R
2
 / 
R
2
  is chi-squared distributed with n
R
-1 degrees of freedom 
 
ξ𝑛𝐿(mL-mL)/L has a t distribution with nL-1 degrees of freedom 
ξ𝑛𝑅(mR-mR)/R has a t distribution with nR-1 degrees of freedom 
The least favorable values are: 
upper confidence bounds for the variances, i.e. 
ඥሺ𝑛𝑅 − 1ሻ/𝐶ℎ𝑖2ሺ𝑛𝑅 − 1; 1 − 𝛾ሻ𝜎𝑅, (10) 
ඥሺ𝑛𝐿 − 1ሻ/𝐶ℎ𝑖2ሺ𝑛𝐿 − 1; 1 − 𝛾ሻ𝜎𝐿 (11) 
where Chi2(n;1-) is the quantile of the Chi-squared distribution with 1- coverage and 
the lower confidence bound for m
L
  
m
L
-t(n
L
-1;)
L
/ξ𝑛𝐿 (12) 
and the upper confidence bound for m
R
 
m
R
+t(n
R
-1;)
R
/ξ𝑛𝑅, (13) 
where t(n;) is the quantile of the t distribution with n degrees of freedom and coverage 1-. 
Inserting the confidence bounds (10) – (13) into the formulae (2) – (5) gives the probabilities 
of errors. 
If misclassification with a type one error is dangerous, (1) with (6) and (8) gives the probability 
of a dangerous failure. However, to account for errors coming from the confidence intervals, 
value 
+2 
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should be used. The interpretation of  as a probability that the true value lies outside the 
confidence interval is not a frequentist one, but a Bayesian using an appropriate prior. 
For a SIL 1 system, a probability of failure on demand of 0.1 must not be exceeded. This value 
can be seen as a budget: 
One might give 0.05 as a maximal value for hardware failures and 0.05 for the AI algorithm. 
The latter can be split according to 
0.05 = +2 
e.g. in the form  
 = 0.025,  = 0.0125. 
For a SIL 4, IEC 61508 provides a threshold value of 0.0001 for the probability of failure on 
demand. 
The reader might repeat the calculation. As a further exercise, she might consider conditions 
on m and the Sigma values to fulfil the requirements. This simple example shows that 
complicated computations are to be expected. Even with this very simple example, we were 
confronted with complex mathematics. 
What is now the way out of this complicated situation? 
There exist mainly two options: 
1. The AI system does not need a SIL since its behavior does not have critical 
consequences (no injuries to persons etc.) 
2. The AI system is supported by a sufficiently simple E/E/PE system, having the 
necessary SIL, that checks all dangerous decisions according to simpler algorithms 
and inhibits dangerous reactions 
The options need to be supported by a risk analysis (see IEC 61508). 
Research Challenge 
We admit that the example is quite simple and academic, but we believe that we need to 
understand and solve small problems first before we can approach high-dimensional problems. 
In order to take a little bit more practical example, consider the following problem: You are 
given a set of n two-dimensional points which are classified into two sets (like figure 5, but only 
the points). The model is unknown, but you can control the number of points to a certain extent. 
You do not know anything else but that the decision problem is safety-related with SIL x. You 
may choose your favorite classification method, e.g. ANN. 
Under which assumptions can you provide a safety argument according to an acknowledged 
safety standard e. g. IEC 61508? Can you also provide reasonable guidance how the validity 
of your assumptions may be checked in practice? 
This may seem a simple problem, but it has high leverage: If we can’t provide a safety 
argument (under assumptions that can reasonably be checked in practice) then (at least some 
classes of) AI algorithms can’t be used for safety-related applications. But if we can solve the 
problems under certain conditions, we might be able to generalize the approach to higher 
dimensions. 
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Conclusions 
In this paper we have described a possible approach to safety assessment of AI systems 
although several questions remain open and may only be solved in the context of a particular 
application. 
A Safety Integrity Level can be determined as for a normal E/E/PE system. This has to be 
substantiated by a hazard and risk analysis. This is also necessary, if the system does not 
require a SIL. 
AI can be easily used in situations, where no critical consequences occur, which has to be 
supported by a risk analysis. Then, no safety integrity level requirements need to be 
implemented in the system and safety assessment is not necessary. 
We have proposed an approach to analyze the model. The analysis to be carried out depends 
very much on the type of model. An assessment requires always an in-depth model analysis 
of the model of AI, that means AI as such cannot be analyzed since it covers a lot of different 
approaches. The more flexible the model, the more complicated the analysis has to be. For 
use in critical systems it seems a useful approach is to restrict the type of models in order to 
simplify the design and the assessment of the AI system. 
Pearl and Mackenzie (2018) have approached the problem from a similar angle and have 
concluded that causality needs to be introduced into AI, before we can rely on its conclusions. 
One of their conclusions is that it is necessary to “formulate a model of the process that 
generates the data, or at least some aspects of that process”. 
We have provided an academic example in order to show how one would have to proceed for 
this specific type of model. 
Finally, we have introduced a research challenge whose solution might be decisive for the use 
of AI algorithms for safety-related applications. The challenge is to formulate a model of the 
data generation process that allows a safety analysis and that can be justified to hold in 
practical applications. 
In order to use AI systems without the burden of an extensive safety assessment there are 
only two possibilities: either have an AI system that is not safety relevant or have another 
safety relevant E/E/PE system that take over full responsibility for safety. 
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